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EMERGENCY! SAYS WHO?:
ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL ISSUES
CONCERNING MANAGED CARE AND
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES
It is the middle of the night and you wake up with pain in your chest;
you think you are having a heart attack. Although you are a member of a
managed care organization ("MCO"), you do not contact your MCO. In-
stead, you go directly to an emergency room for treatment. Ultimately
tests show that there was no heart attack, but rather just heart-burn. Will
your MCO pay for the emergency service rendered in this scenario? It
appears that in a significant number of instances the answer is no.1 In
some cases, MCOs have denied payment for a member's care because
tests at the emergency room found there was no emergency, 2 or because,
according to the MCO's definition of emergency, there was no emer-
gency. 3 In other cases, payment was denied because the MCO member
1. See Charles S. Clark, Emergency Medicine, 6 CQ RESEARCHER 3 (relating that
most MCOs inform their members that "failure to contact a primary-care physician prior
to emergency treatment may result in denial of payment"); E.B. Boyd, Emergency Care
Can Be Costly: Managed Care Plans Manage to Have E.R. Bill Sent to Subscriber, Prrrs.
POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 11, 1996, at A-7 (reporting that most managed care companies re-
quire a member to get permission to go to an emergency room if there is no "danger to life
or limb," and that members risk nonpayment if the MCO's procedures are not followed);
Testimony July 27, 1995 Richard C. Aghababian, M.D., President American College of
Emergency Physicians, House Ways and Means Health Plans Under Medicare, FED. Docu-
MENT CLEARING HOUSE July 27, 1995, available in 1995 WL 446710 [hereinafter Testi-
mony]. Dr. Aghababian stated, while testifying about the problems concerning emergency
medical care in the age of managed care, that the area of medical care most subject to
payment disputes of 'Medicare enrollees is emergency medical services; 40% of such dis-
putes involved "in-area" emergency care, while another 20% were for "out-of-area" emer-
gency care. Id.
2. See Paul Craig, Health Maintenance Organization Gatekeeping Policies: Potential
Liability for Deterring Access to Emergency Medical Services, 23 J. HEALTH & HOsp. L.
135, 136 (1990) (discussing common theories of payment denial for emergency care used by
MCOs of retrospective denial, pre-authorization requirements, and specific facility re-
quirements); see infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing method of retrospec-
tive review used by MCOs to contain cost).
3. See Vicki A. Baldassano, MCOs, Emergency Room Doctors at Odds Over Cover-
age of Urgent Care, 4 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1545 (Oct. 12, 1995) (reporting that in some
cases MCOs fail to authorize emergency medical care for conditions the plan does not
classify as emergencies); Who Decides if it's an Emergency, THE RECORD, Aug. 14, 1995, at
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did not get required pre-authorization for the emergency service.4 Fur-
thermore, payment has been denied where the MCO member sought
emergency care from a hospital outside of the MCO network.5
Public concern over such MCO payment denials,6 as well as questions
about whether MCO members have adequate access to emergency medi-
cal service, has led to both state and federal legislative initiatives aimed at
regulating the role of MCOs in emergency care.7 The managed care in-
dustry, on the other hand, has argued that there are no widespread
problems concerning emergency medical care, and if there are any une-
ven spots, it is the market place, not the government, that is best suited to
smooth them out.
8
This Comment will focus on the legal issues concerning emergency
medical service in the age of managed care. First, an overView of the
issues involving emergency medical service and managed care will be
given. Next, historical problems concerning access to emergency medical
A10; Clark, supra note 1, at 16 (discussing the definition of emergency and the "prudent
layperson" standard).
4. See Craig, supra note 2, at 136; infra, notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing gatekeeping method of requiring pre-authorization for medical care).
5. Id.
6. For example, USA Today reports that "[c]ritics say some [MCO] plans try to profit
'by refusing to pay for [emergency] care."' Lori Sham, Cost-Control Efforts Lead to Claim
Disputes: Critics Say Some Health Plans Try to Profit 'by Refusing to Pay for Care,' USA
TODAY, Aug. 22, 1995, at B1. An article in the New York Times notes that:
As enrollment in health maintenance organizations soars, hospitals across the
country report that ... [HMOs] are increasingly denying claims for care provided
in hospital emergency rooms .... Dr. Stephan G. Lynn, director of emergency
medicine at St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center in Manhattan, said: "We are
getting more and more refusals by H.M.O.s to pay for care in the emergency
room. The problem is increasing as managed care becomes a more important
source of reimbursement."
Robert Pear, H.M.O.'s Refusing Emergency Claims, Hospitals Assert: Two Missions in
Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1995, at 1, 22.
7. See Jan Ziegler, Behind the Scenes of the Managed Care Backlash, 14 Bus. &
HEALTH 26, 28 (1996) (noting that in 1996 thirteen states passed emergency service laws).
See also Milt Freudenheim, H.M.O's Cope With a Backlash on Cost Cutting, N.Y. TIMES,
May 19, 1996, at 1 (reporting that twelve states have barred insurers "from refusing to pay
for what turn out to be 'unnecessary' emergency room visits, when chest pains, for exam-
ple, are traced to heartburn, not a life threatening heart attack").
With regard to federal legislation, see Clark, supra note 1, at 16 (discussing the Access to
Emergency Medical Services Act originally introduced into the United States House of
Representatives in 1995).
8. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (discussing the free market approach
to the regulation of emergency medical care).
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care- in the United States, as well as federal legislation9 enacted to deal
with limitations of access to emergency care, will be considered. This is
followed by an analysis of state efforts to regulate MCOs with regard to
emergency medical care and the problems states have encountered be-
cause of the preemption provisions of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA"). 1° This Comment then examines a variety of
solutions to the problems concerning the regulation of MCOs, including
federal action and proposals put forward by the managed care industry.
The Comment concludes that the best solution to the problems concern-
ing the role of managed care in emergency service would be the passage
of a federal statute that would set minimum standards for emergency
medical coverage. Such a statute would eliminate the problem of ERISA
preemption faced by the states in their regulatory efforts.
I. OVERVIEW
A. Emergency Medical Care: Cost and Payment Issues
Emergency medical service is an expensive sector of the United States'
health care industry. One recent estimate put its cost between twenty-
five and thirty billion dollars per year.1 Emergency room care gener-
ally is thought to be nuch more expensive than care provided in a regular
office visit,12 though this notion recently has been challenged.13 In addi-
9. See, e.g., The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986, 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994) [hereinafter EMTALA].
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
11. Robert M. Williams, M.D., Dr.P.H., F.A.C.E.P., Mills Memorial Lecture-Ameri-
can College of Emergency Physicians (Feb. 20, 1996) (on file with author). See also Craig,
supra note 2, at 136 (noting that a great proportion of health care resources have been
devoted to creating hospital emergency departments and that emergency care is cited as
being a major contributor to the increasing cost of health insurance).
12. See Mark D. Somerson, Emergency Rooms Swamped; Hospitals are Wrestling with
Skyrocketing Number of Visits, COLUMBus DISPATCH, Feb. 19, 1996, at 1A. A spokesman
for the Ohio HMO Association reported that emergency care can cost "two to three times
as much as a doctor's office visit." Id. at 2A. See also Clark, supra note 1, at 3 (also noting
that emergency care costs two to three times as much as the same care at a nonemergency
facility, and that this care "burdens plans with an estimated $5 billion in unnecessary ex-
penses") (citing Laurence C. Baker & Linda Schuurman, Excess. Cost of Emergency De-
partment Visits for Non-Urgent Care, HEALTH AFFAIRS, at 162-71 (Winter 1994).
13. See Robert M. Williams, M.D., Dr.P.H., F.A.C.E.P., The Costs of Visits to Emer-
gency Departments, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 642, 642-46 (1996). Williams suggests that by
looking at the "marginal" costs of treatment of nonurgent care in an emergency depart-
ment, the true cost of nonurgent care is shown to be actually "relatively low," and potential
savings from diverting patients to private physicians rather than emergency departments
may be much lower than commonly believed. Id. at 642. The marginal costs are the extra
costs that would be incurred for an additional office visit. That is, the cost of opening a
1997]
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tion, there is also evidence of widespread abuse of emergency care, with
unnecessary emergency room visits resulting in avoidable increased
health care costs.14 Juxtaposed with the cost of emergency medical care is
the fact that MCOs are put under tremendous pressure to counter spiral-
ling increases in health care costs in the United States.15 Thus, the ques-
tion of who will foot the bill for emergency medical care is of major
importance to the health care industry's major players. Hospitals,
through their emergency departments, 6 MCOs,' 7 and MCO members,18
are among those that have the most at stake financially. Additionally, it
has been suggested that the way in which MCOs are allowed to operate
potentially could affect the continued existence of the emergency medical
care system in the United States, which now includes hospital-maintained
emergency rooms, open twenty-four hours a day.19
In considering the payment issue, it is apparent that particular tension
exists between hospitals and MCOs ° regarding payment for MCO mem-
primary care or similar office at off hours. Id. The results of Dr. Williams' study indicate
that emergency department costs are similar to those of an office visit. Id.
14. The General Accounting Office ("GAO") estimated in 1993 that 43% of visits to
the emergency department were nonurgent. Clark, supra note 1, at 6. But see Helen Lipp-
man, The Games Plans Play with ER Bills: Emergency Room Bills, Bus. & HEALTH, June
1996, at 20 (presenting the argument that the "more realistic" figure of inappropriate
emergency care is 25% to 30%. It is suggested that the GAO figure did not allow for the
"marginal or hard-to-distinguish cases." Id. at 23). Note that taking the lowest figure of
25% there are 23 million unnecessary visits to emergency rooms each year. Id.
15. See Pear, supra note 6, at 22. See also Bernice Caldwell, State Mandates on Man-
aged Care Form 1996 Election Issues, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REV., Aug. 1996, at 48, 48-
54 (noting that managed care was "touted as the most promising" system to control "esca-
lating costs"). Caldwell also proffers that managed care has, in fact, contained costs, but
that the methods that MCOs have used to accomplish this have been so restrictive as to
cause a public backlash. Id.
16. In this Comment, "hospitals" refers to those hospitals that are not affiliated in any
way with the MCO, for whose member the hospital emergency room provided care.
17. Throughout this Comment, MCO will be used to denote any managed health care
organization, including Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs"), Preferred Provider
Organizations ("PPOs"), and the like. See David E. Loder & Lisa Clark, Hospitals in
Code-Blue Catch-22, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 18, 1995, at B9 (noting that "'[m]anaged care orga-
nizations' is an umbrella term for the numerous types of delivery systems that are designed
to manage members' medical care").
18. The term "MCO member" is used in this Comment to refer to any individual en-
rolled in a managed care organization.
19. See Williams, supra note 13, at 644 (suggesting that if emergency departments were
reimbursed on the basis of just cost, a trend in the managed care industry, the emergency
care system, which also services the uninsured, might fail to be financially viable).
20. The hospitals and MCOs as referred to in this Comment are unaffiliated with one
another. This means that the hospital and MCO are independent entities and not in the
same managed care system, or in any other partnership arrangement.
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ber emergency medical care rendered by hospital emergency depart-
ments. The hospitals and MCOs are intertwined in a relationship in
which the hospital emergency department finds itself the provider of care
for MCO members, while the MCO serves as payor.2' On the one hand,
hospitals who receive Medicare funds and have emergency departments
are required under federal law to provide screening and, if necessary,
emergency medical service to all who show up at the emergency room.22
Some MCOs, however, have been accused of refusing reimbursement for
their MCO members where such service was provided by the hospital
emergency department.23 Critics suggest that MCOs sometimes are able
to avoid their obligation to pay for MCO member emergency service by
taking advantage of the complex, often confusing interaction between
state and federal laws that regulate MCO coverage of emergency medical
24service.
B. Methods of MCO Cost Containment
To limit costs, MCOs utilize a practice called retrospective review
which determines whether a medical procedure is covered after the pro-
cedure has been performed.25 Under this practice, a MCO may review
emergency room care already received by a MCO member and then deny
payment "for visits determined to be medically unnecessary."26 This ret-
rospective denial of coverage is based on diagnostic tests showing that no
emergency medical condition occurred.27 Recall the scenario in which
the MCO refuses payment for a MCO member's emergency room care,
after what was thought to be a heart attack, turned out to be heart-burn
instead.28
21. This is the situation where a MCO member is not receiving emergency medical
service from the MCO itself, but rather through a nonaffiliated hospital emergency depart-
ment. See Loder & Clark, supra note 17, at B9 (discussing the tension that is created when
a hospital emergency room treats an MCO member, but the MCO is reluctant to, or fails
to, pay for this service).
22. EMTALA of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1995).
23. For discussions of how MCOs use federal law and EMTALA to deny payment for
emergency care, see Mary Ellen Lloyd, ER Workers Lobby to Make HMOs Pay Fees:
Emergency Charges Often Denied, THE CAPITAL, Feb. 28, 1996, at D1; Lippman, supra
note 13, at 21; Pear, supra note 6, at 1, 22; Sham, supra note 6, at 1; Loder & Clark, supra
note 17, at B9.
24. See Loder & Clark, supra note 17, at B9.
25. See id.; Craig, supra note 2, at 136; Lippman, supra note 14, at 21; Robert Kuttner,
Health-Care Backlash, WASH. POST, July 28, 1996, at C7.
26. Craig, supra note 2, at 136 (citation omitted).
27. Baldassano, supra note 3, at 1545.
28. Sham, supra note 6, at 1; Kuttner, supra note 25, at C7.
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"Gatekeeping"2 9 practices, which require pre-authorization for emer-
gency services, may also be invoked by a MCO to deny payment for a
member's emergency medical care. The American College of Emergency
Room Physicians ("ACEP") has documented a number of specific exam-
ples where MCOs denied coverage for emergency care because the mem-
ber failed to get prior-authorization from the MCO. In one case, a
twenty-five year old went to the hospital emergency room after putting
his hand through a window. Although the patient had bled profusely,
coverage was denied because there was no referral.3° In another case, a
sixty-four year old man went to a hospital emergency room with abdomi-
nal pain. Despite the fact that the MCO member was put into the inten-
sive care unit and died within twenty-four hours after admission, the
MCO denied his claim because he had not received a referral from his
Primary Care Physician.
31
MCOs also have denied coverage when the MCO member did not use
a pre-authorized emergency facility for emergency medical treatment;
32
that is, when the MCO member went to a hospital outside of the MCO
network.
33
Another way that MCOs control costs is to pay only for those emer-
gency visits specifically defined as emergencies. While MCO members,
based on their own experience, may in good faith be convinced they face
a medical emergency, the MCO may not include that condition in its defi-
nition of emergency and deny payment on that basis.34 Thus, it would
29. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D., Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 23 (1986) (describing gatekeeping as
guarding society's resources and cutting health care costs by conserving "tests, treatments,
operations, hospitalization, and referrals for consultation"). Id. Pellegrino argues against
the concept of gatekeeping as being "morally unsound and factually suspect." Id. at 24.
30. Memo from Charlotte S. Yeh, M.D., F.S.C.E.P. to Jane Howell, American College
of Emergency Physicians (Apr. 4, 1995) (distributed by American College of Emergency
Physicians) (fax and accompanying memo on file with author). This and many other spe-
cific examples of similar situations have been documented by the American College of
Emergency Physicians. Id.
31. Id.
32. Pear, supra note 6, at 1, 22.
33. Marge Roukema, Roukema Legislation Requires HMOs to Pay Emergency Room
Bills, Press Release, FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, INC. (July 13, 1995).
34. See Pear, supra note 6, at 1, 22 ("Most [HMOs] promise to cover emergency medi-
cal services, but there is no standard definition of the term. [HMOs] can define it narrowly
and typically reserve the right to deny payment if they conclude, in retrospect, that the
conditions treated were not emergencies."), Id.
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seem that a medical emergency is "in the eye of the beholder."35
It has been observed that "hospitals are put in an untenable position
when MCOs refuse to pay for emergency room services."36 When an
MCO refuses to pay for a member's emergency care, the cost shifts to the
hospital that provided the care, even though the hospital may not be able
to absorb the cost, or it is shifted to the individual MCO member, who
also may find the expense impossible to absorb.37
C. MCO Practices That Limit Access to Emergency Medical Care
Coupled with financial considerations, is public concern over adequate
MCO member access to emergency medical care, as the United States
witnesses the transformation of its health care system from a "fee-for-
service medical delivery system,, 38 to a managed care system that empha-.
sizes "pre-arranged care through certain physicians.,
39
At issue are MCO practices and policies that limit a MCO member's
access to emergency service, such as restricting or deterring the use of
"911" emergency phone numbers. It has been reported that some MCOs
actually try to dissuade MCO members from using the 911 emergency
telephone service, thus exposing members to greater health risks.4° One
study noted that it found only two out of sixteen MCOs located in a ma-
jor metropolitan area that had instructed their subscribers to use the 911
paramedic system in the event of a medical emergency.41 In both cases
the member was directed to use the 911 number only after attempting to
contact the MCO gatekeeper.42
Another MCO practice of concern, which may have the effect of limit-
ing MCO member access to emergency medical service, is "gatekeep-
ing. ''43  It is reasonable to suggest that the threat of refusal to pay for
non-preauthorized emergency care may deter a MCO member's use of
35. Mary Ellen Lloyd, HMOs Often Dispute Bills From the ER, THE SUN. CAPITAL,
Aug. 27, 1995, at Al.
36. Baldassano. supra note 3, at 1546.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1545.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See G. Hossfeld & M. Ryan, HMOs and Utilization of Emergency Medical Serv-
ices: A Metropolitan Survey, 18 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 374, 374-75 (1989).
42. Id.
43. See Craig, supra note 2, at 136 (general discussion of gatekeeping procedures). See
also Pellegrino, supra note 29, at 23 (analyzing the ethical considerations of medical
gatekeeping).
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emergency services, thus effectively restricting access to treatment. How-
ever, the managed care industry argues that the practice of restricting a
MCO member's access to emergency medical care is necessary in order to
manage patient care effectively and reduce the cost of health care." Poli-
cies requiring preauthorization for emergency services, however, can be
in direct conflict with a MCO member's unobstructed access to emer-
gency medical care.45 One commentator has suggested that this is one of
the "chief obstacles facing patients" seeking appropriate emergency med-
ical care.46 An additional criticism includes the allegation that MCOs put
members' health in danger by not providing twenty-four hour access to,
or timely authorization for, emergency medical service.47
II. THE HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF ACCESS TO EMERGENCY MEDICAL
CARE IN THE UNITED STATES
In order to understand the status of the current law, it is necessary to
review the issues that helped to shape that law. Problems with patient
access to medical care are not new in the United States. Congress recog-
nized the problem of the inability of the indigent to obtain adequate med-
ical care in 1946 when it passed the Hill-Burton Act.4 8 This Act was
meant to give federal aid to hospitals so that they might be able to pro-
vide medical care to the indigent.49
More recently, the tremendous expense of medical care in the United
States, particularly emergency medical care, coupled with a significant
and increasing uninsured population and compounded by an "increased
focus by the health care industry on containing rising costs," 50 resulted in
a practice known as "patient dumping."51 Patient dumping has been de-
fined as "the denial of emergency medical services or the premature
transfer of a patient from one hospital to another because the person
44. Craig, supra note 2, at 138.
45. See Baldassano, supra note 3, at 1545-46.
46. Id. at 1545.
47. Letter from Congressman Ben Cardin, United States House of Representatives
(June 30, 1995) (inviting co-sponsors of the Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of
1995) [hereinafter Cardin Letter] (on file with the author).
48. Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton Act), 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1994).
49. Judith L. Dobbertin, Note, Eliminating Patient Dumping. A Proposal for Model
Legislation, 28 VAL. U.L. REV. 291, 297 (1993).
50. Mary Jean Fell, Comment, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act of 1986: Providing Protection from Discrimination in Access to Emergency Medical
Care, 43 CATH. U.L. REV. 607, 607 (1994).
51. Dobbertin, supra note 49, at 291 n.2.
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cannot guarantee payment."52 In 1992, "it was estimated that thirty-six
million Americans, fifteen percent of the population, did not have health
insurance.,53 The cost to private hospitals for care of this uninsured pop-
ulation led many to refuse to treat these patients and to unload them,
primarily from their emergency rooms, to public hospitals.54 This prac-
tice significantly limited access to emergency medical service for those
individuals who did not have medical insurance and were unable to pay
for such service.
55
III. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS OF INADEQUATE ACCESS
TO EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE
In 1986, Congress enacted EMTALA "as part of the Consolidated Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA"). 56 This federal response
to patient dumping is codified in section 1395dd of Title forty-two of the
United States Code.57 EMTALA was created by Congress to eliminate
patient dumping, and it "established specific standards for the evaluation,
treatment, and transfer of patients., 58 EMTALA mandated that "a hos-
pital that has a hospital emergency department ... must provide [an indi-
vidual] ... an appropriate medical screening examination ... [and also
any] [n]ecessary stabilizing treatment [required] for emergency medical
conditions and labor."59
In the case of In re Baby "K,"'6 the court described EMTALA as Con-
gress' attempt to "provide an adequate first response to a medical crisis'
for all patients.",61 EMTALA created two basic requirements for hospi-
tals subject to Medicare provider agreements. First, such a hospital with
an emergency department must provide "appropriate medical screen-
ing to conclude whether the patient who presents63 him or herself for
52. Id.
53. Id. at 292-93.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Fell, supra note 50, at 608. Throughout the literature and cases the terms EM-
TALA and COBRA are used interchangeably to describe 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1995). In
this Comment EMTALA will be used to avoid confusion.
57. Id. at n.9.
58. Smith v. Richmond Mem. Hosp., 416 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Va. 1992).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)(b) (1994).
60. 16 F.3d 590, 590 (4th Cir. 1993).
61. Id. at 593.
62. Id.
63. In the medical profession the term "to present" means simply that a patient
presents him or herself for treatment.
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treatment at the emergency room is suffering from an emergency medical
condition. To meet this requirement, a hospital must use the same
screening procedures for everyone with the same symptoms or condi-
tion.' Second, if an emergency condition is discovered, the hospital is
required to treat the patient to "prevent material deterioration of the in-
dividual's condition or provide for an appropriate transfer to another
facility."
65
Central to EMTALA is the fact that it "allows 'any individual' who
presents him or herself at a hospital emergency room to invoke the pro-
tection of EMTALA when a hospital refuses to screen or stabilize the
individual's condition., 66 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit clarified this point in In re Baby "K."' 67 In this case, a
hospital argued that it should be allowed to discontinue periodic emer-
gency treatment of an anencephalic infant.68 The hospital reasoned that
EMTALA would not be violated by this denial of emergency care be-
cause Baby "K" was not an 'individual' under the meaning of EM-
TALA.69 The court rejected this argument, however, holding that
EMTALA did apply to all individuals including anencephalic infants, and
determined that the hospital had a duty under EMTALA to prevent a
material deterioration in Baby "K"'s condition.7"
The interpretation of EMTALA by the court in In re Baby "K" illus-
trates that hospitals are required to provide access to emergency care to
any and all individuals presenting at the emergency room.71 There is
strong incentive for hospitals not to violate EMTALA. A hospital may
be subject to civil penalties of up to $50,000 for each violation as well as
potential exclusion from the Medicare program, "which could cost the
64. 16 F.3d at 590.
65. Id. at 594.
66. Pamela K. Epps, Note, In Defense of the Masses-An Interpretation of the Emer-
gency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act: In re Baby K, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1209
(1995) (citations omitted).
67. 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1993).
68. Anencephaly is a "congenital malformation in which a major portion of the brain,
skull, and scalp are missing." Id. at 592.
69. Id. at 594. The hospital reasoned that it should not have been obligated to provide
respiratory support for Baby "K" when she came to the emergency room in distress be-
cause, in part, physicians considered such care medically and ethically inappropriate. Thus,
EMTALA did not apply to this situation, despite the fact that failure to provide Baby "K"
with emergency respiratory care would cause her condition to materially deteriorate. Id. at
594-95.
70. Id at 595-96. See also Epps, supra note 66, at 1209.
71. In re Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 592.
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hospital millions more annually. 72
EMTALA, however, has been judicially determined not to apply to
MCOs, 73 but rather only to hospitals. 74 For example, in the case of
Dearmas v. AV-Med, Inc.,7 a patient who presented herself for treatment
in a hospital emergency room was transferred to several other facilities by
the order of her MCO. 76 The patient sued the MCO claiming that the
transfers caused delay which resulted in "irreversible neurological dam-
ages."'77 The court held, however, that the plaintiff did not have a cause
of action under EMTALA because "the statute provides a private cause
of action only against 'hospitals. ' ' 78 This has resulted in situations where
the hospital emergency department is forced by the federal government
to provide service to an individual who is an MCO member, but the
MCO, because it is not covered under EMTALA, is able to refuse pay-
ment to the hospital for services rendered.
Hospitals, thus have, found themselves in a "Catch 22" situation.79
MCOs put terrific pressure on hospital emergency departments to trans-
fer or discharge their members. But the hospitals risk sanctions from the
federal government if they comply with the MCO demands, and risk non-
payment for MCO member care, if they do not comply.
80
It is argued that some MCOs have taken advantage of the fact that they
are not subject to EMTALA, denying coverage and limiting member ac-
cess to emergency care based on one of several theories. The MCO may
refuse payment for member emergency room bills when the patient ulti-
mately is determined not to have a medical emergency (retrospective de-
nial), or when a member fails to get prior authorization for treatment at a
hospital that is not a part of the MCO system (prospective denial).8 ' In
72. Loder & Clark, supra note 17, at B9.
73. See Dearmas v. AV-Med, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
74. Dearmas was the only case found dealing directly with the issue of MCOs not
being subject to EMTALA, but rather only hospitals. EMTALA's application to only hos-
pitals also is found in the several cases holding that EMTALA only applies to hospitals and
does not apply to physicians. See Richardson v. Southwest Miss. Regional Med. Ctr., 794
F. Supp. 198, 200 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Delaney v. Cade, 756 F. Supp. 1476, 1486-87 (D. Kan.
1991); Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 877 (4th Cir. 1992); Howe v. Hull,
873 F. Supp. 70, 71 (W.D. Ohio 1994).
75. Dearmas, 814 F. Supp. at 1103.
76. Id. at 1105.
77. Id.
78. Loder & Clark, supra note 17, at Bl.
79. Id.
80. Id. at B9.
81. See Craig, supra note 2, at 136; Roukema, supra note 33; Baldassano, supra note 3,
at 1545.
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addition, MCOs are sometimes unwilling to authorize care for conditions
that are not classified by the MCO as an emergency.82 The end result is
that some MCOs have severely limited access to emergency medical care
in their pursuit of keeping costs down.83
IV. THE STATES ATrEMPT TO REGULATE THE ROLE OF MCOs IN
EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE
States have been forced to face the fact that the obligations put on
hospitals to guarantee emergency medical care by EMTALA do not ex-
tend to MCOs.84 In addition, states have had to face concerns regarding
MCOs discouraging their members' use of "911" emergency phone serv-
ices." Several states have responded by promulgating their own laws
regulating MCOs with regard to emergency medical service.8 6 The goals
of these laws are to ensure that MCO members have adequate access to
emergency medical care and that MCOs do not set up unreasonable road-
blocks that shield them from the financial cost of this care. 7
For example, the state of Maryland has endeavored to stop retrospec-
tive denials of emergency care coverage by MCOs with the institution of
a uniform definition of emergency that is based on a "prudent layperson"
standard.88 This has required payment decisions to be determined by the
symptoms of the patient, rather than on whether the MCO member fi-
nally is diagnosed to have an emergency medical condition. 9 Virginia,9"
82. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
83. Baldassano, supra note 3, at 1545.
84. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
85. 911 emergency telephone systems are designed to reduce the response time for
medical emergencies. A survey conducted by the Department of Surgery, University of
Illinois, Chicago, showed that of the 16 major MCOs in the Chicago area, 15 of them
(containing 99% of the area's total MCO-members) did not advise the use of a 911 number
as the first response to a medical emergency. Rather, they advised their members to con-
tact either the MCO office, or the patient's primary care physician first. In addition, only
two MCOs (containing only seven percent of the area's total MCO-members) suggested in
their brochures that the 911 emergency number be used. "These data suggest that ...
[MCO members] may not be adequately informed regarding proper use of 911 and the
emergency medical services system." Hossfeld & Ryan, supra note 41, at 374-75. See also
Phone-a-Nurse Cuts Down on ER Visits, HEALTH Bus., Dec., 3, 1993 available in LEXIS,
Health Law File (illustrating a program used by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Oregon specifi-
cally designed to have members call nurses in order to avoid alleged unnecessary member
visits to emergency rooms).
86. See infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text (discussing examples of state laws
attempting to regulate MCOs).
87. Id.
88. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 19-701(d) (1996).
89. Id. at §19-701(f).
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Arkansas,91 and Illinois92 are other states that have adopted a definition
of emergency premised on the "prudent layperson" standard.
The Maryland definition of "emergency services," based on the "pru-
dent layperson" standard, is as follows:
"Emergency services" means those health care services that are
provided in a hospital emergency facility after the sudden onset
of a medical condition that manifests itself by symptoms of suffi-
cient severity, including severe pain, that the absence of immedi-
ate medical attention could reasonably be expected by a prudent
layperson, who possesses an average knowledge of health and
medicine, to result in:
(1) Placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy;
(2) Serious impairment to bodily functions; or
(3) Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.
93
The "prudent layperson" standard removes the ability of a MCO to
develop its own interpretation of an emergency, and prevents the MCO
from using its own definition to deny a member coverage for emergency
medical service. The Illinois Emergency Medical Service statute, similar
to the Maryland statute, provides that "'emergency' means a medical
condition of recent onset and severity that would lead a prudent layper-
son, possessing an average knowledge of medicine and health, to believe
that urgent or unscheduled medical care is required." 94 Arkansas also
has sought to put an end to the MCO practice of delaying or denying
emergency medical care for their members because the MCO-member
failed to get the required prospective authorization for treatment. 95
California has one of the most detailed statutes governing MCOs re-
garding emergency medical service. 96 For example, California requires
that MCOs provide "24-hour access for enrollees and providers to obtain
timely authorization for medically necessary care."97  Additionally,
MCOs must pay hospitals for emergency medical services provided to
MCO-members "until the care results in stabilization of the enrollee."
98
California also prohibits MCOs from requiring prior authorization for
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4300 (Michie 1995).
91. 1995 Ark. Acts 1358.
92. 1995 Ill. Laws 177.
93. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 19-701 (1996) (emphasis added).
94. 1995 Ill. Laws 177.
95. 1995 Ark. Acts 1358.
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emergency medical service if federal or state law requires that "emer-
gency services and care be provided without first questioning the patient's
ability to pay."99 In fact, the only reason that an MCO is allowed to deny
payment for a member's emergency medical service is if it is found that
the provider never performed the services listed on the bill.' 0 This stat-
ute seems to be an attempt to deal directly with the failure of EMTALA
to regulate MCOs with regard to emergency medical service.
V. THE STATES ENCOUNTER THE ROADBLOCK OF
ERISA PREEMPTION
A. The Basics of ERISA Preemption
Despite the desire to regulate MCOs regarding emergency medical ser-
vice, a number of states have found their efforts frustrated by preemption
under the federal Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act ("ER-
ISA").' 0' A discussion of the main points involving ERISA preemption
will provide an understanding of the general problems that states have in
trying to reform and regulate health care through state legislation. How-
ever, it is beyond the scope of this Comment to present an exhaustive
analysis of ERISA preemption issues.' °2
Preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause of the United States
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994). See Robert J. Conrad & Patrick D. Seiter, Health Plan
Liability in the Age of Managed Care, DEF. COUNS. J., Apr. 1995, at 198.
102. There has been much written about ERISA preemption of state law. The follow-
ing is a list, by no means exhaustive, of some recent publications on the subject. Nicole
Weisenborn, ERISA Preemption and its Effect on State Health Reform, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 147 (1995); Jolee An Hancock, Diseased Federalism: State Health Care Laws Fall
Prey to ERISA Preemption, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 383 (1995); Janice M. Smith, The United
States Supreme Court Held that State Hospital Rate-Setting Statutes Which Impose a Signifi-
cant Indirect Burden On Employee Retirement Income Security Act Plans do not "Relate to"
the Plans Sufficiently to Invoke Preemption of State Laws, 34 Duo. L. REV. 163 (1995);
David T. Shapiro, The Remission of ERISA Preemption: An Examination of Blue Cross/
Blue Shield v. Travelers Insurance Co., 28 CoNN. L. REV. 917 (1996); Walter E. Schuler,
Note, The ERISA Pre-emption Narrows: Analysis of New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company and its Impact on State Regula-
tion of Health Care 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 783 (1996); Elizabeth Rover Bailey, ERISA Pre-
emption-When Does a State Law "Relate to" an ERISA Plan?: New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 37 B.C. L. REV.
382 (1996). Theodore Einhorn, Note, Reigning in ERISA Preemption? Any Willing Pro-
vider Statutes after New York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 13 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 265 (1996).
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Constitution. 103 The doctrine of preemption requires that if any state law
is in actual conflict with an act of Congress by express provision, by impli-
cation, or by a conflict between state and federal law, the federal law
supersedes, or preempts, the state law.1' 4 In fact, ERISA § 514(a) °5 has
in it a specific preemption clause. Simply put, ERISA preempts any state
laws that "may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan de-
scribed in section 1003(a)."'1 6
The court in Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc.10 7 noted that "[t]he
most obvious class of pre-empted state laws are those that are specifically
designed to affect ERISA-governed employee benefit plans.' 0 8 An ER-
ISA employee welfare benefit plan is defined as a plan established by an
employer that provides its participants or beneficiaries "through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise,. . . medical, surgical, or hospital care
or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, [or]
disability." 0 9
1. The Courts Interpret ERISA Preemption Clause
In general, the rule is that "ERISA 'supersedes any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan."' 110 The Supreme Court first interpreted the "relates to" language
in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc."' The Court in Shaw held that a law
'relates to' an employee benefit plan "if it has a connection with or refer-
ence to such a plan."'"1 2 This broad interpretation of ERISA preemption
effectively preempted a state law that touched on an employee benefit
plan, even though the statute was not designed to regulate specifically an
employee benefit plan." 3
At one time it appeared that the expansion of ERISA preemption was
without limit. This trend changed, however, when the Supreme Court
103. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
104. In re Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 596; New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
v. Travelers Ins., 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1676 (1995); BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1177 (6th ed.
1990).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
106. Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321,1328 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1144(a) (1995)).
107. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1321.
108. Id. at 1329.
109. Dearmas, 814 F. Supp. at 1106.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Shaw, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
112. Conrad & Seiter, supra note 101, at 198 n.24.
113. Id.
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reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers Insurance
Co." 4 In Travelers, the Supreme Court criticized the broad definition of
"'relates to' in Shaw,"115 rejecting the Second Circuit's finding of broad
preemption.116 Travelers appeared to adopt the more narrow interpreta-
tion of ERISA preemption, as had been in expressed in United Wire,
Metal & Machine Health and Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hospital." 7
2. A Broad Interpretation of ERISA Preemption
Under the broad interpretation of the "relates to" clause, a variety of
claims against MCOs based on state law are preempted by ERISA. In
one case, for example, the court held that when a claim based on state
law concerned the administration of MCOs (such as dealing with a bene-
fit decision) ERISA preempts the state law.' 18 In Corcoran v. United
HealthCare, Inc.," 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that a Louisiana state law tort claim was preempted by ERISA
because the claim involved "medical decisions incident to benefit deter-
minations" made by an "independent professional medical review organi-
zation"1 2 ° retained by the plaintiff-appellant's MCO. 12' The plaintiff-
appellant in Corcoran argued that the appellee medical review organiza-
tion was liable in tort for the wrongful death of their unborn child be-
cause of the "utilization review" the organization conducted.' 22 While
this medical review organization was not itself the administrator of the
plaintiff-appellant's medical plan, the "claim related to her employee
114. 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995).
115. American Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 915 F. Supp. 740, 744 (D. Md. 1996).
116. The Second Circuit based its holding on the finding of broad preemption in Shaw
v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983) and Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133
(1990). Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 717-19 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd 115 S. Ct.
1671 (1995).
117. 995 F.2d 1179, 1192 (3d Cir. 1993). United Wire held that a "rule of law relates to
an ERISA plan if it is specifically designed to affect employee benefits plans, if it singles
out such plans for special treatment, or if the rights or restrictions it creates are predicated
on the existence of such a plan." Id. The court further held that a state legal requirement
does not "relate to" an ERISA-covered plan if it is "a statute of general applicability" that
"does not single out ERISA plans for special treatment" and that "functions without re-
gard to the existence of such plans." Id.
118. Dukes v. U.S. Health Care, 57 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 1995).
119. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
120. Id. at 1324.
121. Id. at 1331.
122. Id. at 1323-24.
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benefit plan because, but for the plan, . . . [it] would not have been in-
volved in the case."1" 3 The utilization review caused the denial of certain
medical care which the plaintiff-appellant claimed resulted in the death of
the unborn child."24 The court held that while the appellee did make
medical decisions, it did so "in the context of making a determination
about the availability of benefits under the plan."'2 5 Therefore, the plain-
tiff-appellee's claim was "pre-empted by ERISA."' 1 6
An example of state law, designed to regulate MCO emergency medi-
cal service payment and access procedures, struck down based on the the-
ory of ERISA preemption is found in Dearmas v. AV-Med, Inc.'17 In
Dearmas the plaintiff brought a tort action against an MCO, alleging that
the MCO "failed to provide [the patient with] a medical screening exami-
nation, to stabilize treatment and transferred her in an unstable condi-
tion; all in violation of [Florida statute, section] 395.0142. '' 128 The Florida
statute at issue in Dearmas was similar to the Federal EMTALA statute
forbidding patient-dumping.129 The Florida statute, like EMTALA, re-
quired hospitals to provide "appropriate medical screening" to evaluate a
patient's condition to establish whether or not an emergency medical con-
dition existed. If the patient suffered from an emergency medical condi-
tion, then the hospital was required to stabilize the patient before the
patient could be transferred. 3 ° The court in Dearmas ruled, however,
that ERISA preempted the Florida law under the theory that "the cir-
cumstances surrounding the transferring from one medical facility to an-
other, in violation of section 395.0142 involved . . . [the MCO's]
administration of the Plan."' 3 1 The court determined that the plaintiff's
claim "related to" the MCO's administration of the plan and thus was
preempted by ERISA. 132 This shows how an EMTALA-like state law,
specifically meant to apply to MCOs, was preempted by ERISA.
The lesson of Corcoran and Dearmas is that regardless of a state's best
intentions to regulate MCOs in terms of emergency medical service,
whenever MCO decisions regarding its participants come under ERISA
123. Conrad & Seiter, supra note 101, at 198.
124. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1322-24.
125. Id. at 1331.
126. Id.
127. Dearmas. 814 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
128. Id. at 1106.
129. Id. at 1108.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1107.
132. Id.
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and the law "relates to" the administration of the plan, the law is pre-
empted by ERISA. For example, if a state law was intended to prohibit
an MCO from denying or limiting coverage, the courts were "of one
mind" that the claim was preempted by ERISA.
133
3. The Scope of ERISA Preemption Narrows
The recent Supreme Court case of New York Conference of Blue Cross
Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. 134 appears to limit the breadth of ERISA
preemption. Rejecting the argument that ERISA preempted the state
law, the Court upheld a state law requiring hospitals to impose a
surcharge on all health care payers except Blue Cross/Blue Shield. 135 The
Court also took the opportunity to note that Congress, in creating ER-
ISA, did not intend to "displace general health care regulation, which
historically has been a matter of local concern.' 136 The Court rejected
the notion that ERISA preempts all state laws affecting costs and charges
that they indirectly relate to ERISA plans that purchase insurance poli-
cies or HMO memberships that would cover such services. 137 Thus, a
state may impose regulations on a plan that only indirectly affects the
ERISA welfare benefit plan, at least in cases like Travelers which involve
cost issues concerning surcharges required by the state. It may be that
this decision reduces the ERISA preemption roadblock that has thwarted
the states' attempts to regulate healthcare, especially emergency medical
care, though this is by no means certain.
138
B. An Exception to ERISA Preemption: The Savings Clause and the
Deemer Clause
Even if a law is found to "relate to" an employee welfare benefit plan,
it still may be saved from preemption if the law is intended to regulate
insurance.39 Under the insurance savings clause, the states regain the
133. Conrad & Seiter, supra note 101, at 198.
134. 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1680.
137. Id. at 1679.
138. See Daly D.E. Temchine & Marcia S. Handler, Supreme Court Decision in Travel-
ers Leaves Room for Managed Care Entities to Argue ERISA Preemption, 4 Health L. Rep.
(BNA) 1199, 1200 (Aug. 3, 1995) (reading the Travelers decision as not limiting ERISA,
pointing to the Court's warning that where a state law has "acute, albeit indirect, economic
effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of
substantive coverage.., such a state law might indeed be pre-empted." 115 S.Ct. at 1683).
139. American Med. Sec., Inc. 915 F. Supp. at 744.
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power to "enforce those state laws that 'regulate insurance' except as pro-
vided in the deemer clause. But under the deemer clause an employee
benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be 'deemed' an insurance com-
pany, an insurer, or engaged in the business of insurance."' 4 ° Thus, the
savings clause and the deemer clause allow states to regulate plans that
are insured, indirectly, by regulating the insurer and the insurer's
contracts.
The Supreme Court interpreted the insurance clause in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.141 Here the Court held that "insured
ERISA health plans were subject to State insurance law mandating spe-
cific benefit features, which in this case were mental health benefits.,
142
A related issue is whether MCOs themselves are to be considered a
form of insurance if the MCO provides service to an employee welfare
benefit plan. It appears that there is some division among the jurisdic-
tions in this regard. Some courts have construed MCO health plans,
which are provided by employers to employees as part of a benefits pack-
age as ERISA employee welfare benefit plans.' 43 Under this theory, it is
"commonly accepted" that MCOs are subject to ERISA where the MCO
coverage is purchased by a private employer for its employees as part of a
health benefits package.'" Other courts, however, have found MCOs to
be insurers and thus exempt from ERISA preemption under the insur-
ance savings clause. 45
C. Self-Funded Plans: The Achilles Heel of State Health Care
Reform Efforts
One type of plan that definitely is subject to ERISA preemption, how-
ever, is the self-funded plan.146 The Supreme Court has determined that
140. Id.
141. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
142. Michael S. Gordon, Managed Care, ERISA Pre-emption, and Health Reform-the
Current Outlook, 3 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 647, 648 (Apr. 17, 1995).
143. Conrad & Seiter, supra note 101, at 198. See also O'Reilly v. Culeers, 912 F.2d
1383 (1lth Cir. 1990) (holding that HMOs are not insurers under the ERISA savings clause
because they are both insurers and providers and in some instances not regulated by state
insurance commissions).
144. Conrad & Seiter, supra note 101, at 198.
145. Page v. Heeman, Civ. No. L.93-372, slip op. at 10-11 (D. Md. 1993). See also letter
from Kathryn M. Rowe, Maryland Assistant Attorney General to Maryland state Senator
Thomas Patrick O'Reilly (Apr. 6, 1994) (stating that HMOs are part of the insurance
industry).
146. PATRICIA A. BUTLER, J.D., NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N, ROADBLOCK TO REFORM:
ERISA IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE HEALTH CARE INITIATIVES 20 (1994).
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self-funded health plans are not insurance, and thus not subject to state
regulation under ERISA's deemer clause.1 47 Since the Supreme Court
decided Metropolitan Life, many employers have changed from insured
ERISA health plans to self-funded health plans.' 48 This has meant that
many self-funded managed care programs are left protected by ERISA
preemption, and thus exempt from state regulation."' 9 The General Ac-
counting Office ("GAO") estimated that in 1993 forty-four million per-
sons were enrolled in self-funded ERISA health plans. 5 °
VI. SOLUTIONS
A. Federal Action
Passage of a federal statute regulating emergency medical service is
one solution to the shortcomings of the current legal situation. The Ac-
cess to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1995151 ("AEMSA") was one
proposed piece of legislation that was introduced into the 104th Congress
by Congressman Ben Cardin and co-sponsored by Congresswoman
Marge Roukema. It failed to pass, but has been reintroduced into the
105th Congress with some changes, discussed below, which may increase
its chances of passage by Congress.
The AEMSA was intended to solve the problems associated with the
regulation of MCO emergency medical service coverage. Congressman
Cardin argued that a federal remedy is needed, in part, because states
cannot regulate self-insured health plans that come under ERISA, due to
the threat of preemption. 5 ' The AEMSA, which would be federal law,
would not suffer from ERISA preemption.
One of the important features of the AEMSA was that it provided the
147. Id. See also American Med. Sec., Inc., 915 F. Supp. at 745 (citing FMC Corp., 498
U.S. at 61 (holding that the deemer clause exempts self-funded ERISA plans from state
laws)).
148. Metropolitan Life was decided in 1985. 471 U.S. at 724. The United States Gen-
eral Accounting Office estimated that "the percentage of plan participants enrolled in self-
funded health plans has increased from about 28 percent in 1986 to about 46 percent in
1993." UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH
PLANS: ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 12 (1995) [hereinafter
"GAO"].
149. Id. at 12. The GAO notes that large firms are where use of self-funding is most
prevalent. The GAO reports that "78 percent of firms with 1,000 or more employees and
89 percent of firms with 20,000 or more employees were self-funded in 1993." Id.
150. Id. at 9.
151. H.R. 2011, 104th Cong. (1995).
152. Baldassano, supra note 3, at 1546.
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nation with a uniform definition of emergency. 153 The AEMSA adopted
the "prudent layperson" definition of emergency in Maryland, 5 4 Vir-
ginia,155 Arkansas, 56 and Illinois, 57 and incorporate it as the national,
uniform definition. 5 8 Additionally, the AEMSA dealt directly with the
issue of MCO payment denials to hospital emergency departments for
care provided to MCO members.15 9 It eliminated the situation where the
hospital emergency department is required by federal law 160 to provide
screening and care to presenting patients,' 6 ' yet allowed MCOs to deny
payment after their member had received emergency care, based on ret-
rospective reviews.16' The AEMSA required that all health plans pay
hospitals and physicians for federally required emergency medical
service.1
63
In addition to payment issues, the AEMSA also addressed the question
of MCO restrictions on patient access to emergency medical service. The
AEMSA prohibited the pre-authorization requirement for emergency
services and the requirement that the MCO member must use a MCO
network facility. 164 In another effort to control gatekeeping procedures,
the AEMSA mandated that MCOs provide twenty-four hour access and
timely authorization (no more than thirty minutes) for MCO members
requiring emergency care.' 65 Finally, the AEMSA promoted access to
emergency medical service by assuring that MCOs not only encourage
the use of the "911" emergency telephone system, but also barred MCOs
from creating "barriers" to the system's appropriate use.' 66
Changes to the AEMSA, reintroduced into the 105th Congress as the
Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997 ("AEMSA-97"), 67
153. Cardin Letter, supra note 47.
154. Mo. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-701 (1996).
155. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4300 (Michie 1995).
156. 1995 Ark. Acts 1358.
157. 1995 Il. Laws 177.
158. Cardin Letter, supra note 46.
159. H.R. 2011, 104th Cong. (1995).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1995).
161. Id.
162. See Pear, supra note 6, at 1, 22.
163. H.R. 2011, 104th Cong. (1995).
164. Id.
165. Cardin Letter, supra note 47.
166. Id.
167. H.R. 815, 105th Cong. (1997). See Office of Representative Ben Cardin, An-
nouncement: The Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997 to be Introduced by
Rep. Ben Cardin (D-Md.) and Rep. Marge Roukema (R-N.J.) (Feb. 1997) (on file with
author) [hereinafter "Cardin Announcement"].
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include several important refinements. Perhaps the most important re-
finement is that the AEMSA-97 will implement the strategy of amending
ERISA to include the AEMSA-97's provisions, a strategy that was used
in the two health care reform bills that did pass the 104th Congress. 168
These are the Kennedy-Kassebaum Insurance Reform Bill, 169 and the
Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996.170 AEMSA-97
also provides that there is no preemption of state law "as long as the state
law does not prevent the application of federal law."'' Additionally,
AEMSA-97 permits health plans to create "reasonable cost-sharing dif-
ferentials for emergency care" for times when a plan participant decides
to utilize an emergency, rather than a nonemergency, setting or when an
out-of-plan emergency setting is chosen over an in-plan setting.' 72 The
AEMSA-97 continues to prohibit a requirement of preauthorization
before a patient may use emergency medical services.' 73 Moreover, the
AEMSA-97 continues to use the "prudent layperson" standard to define
emergency and requires health plans to instruct their members on the
"appropriate use of emergency medical services, including the use of the
911 system.'
'1 74
The Original AEMSA received support from within the health care
industry, including the American College of Emergency Physicians, the
Emergency Nurses Association, and the American Association of Neuro-
logical Surgeons. 175 Supporters of the AEMSA-97 also include the
American Medical Association, 176 and the American Hospital Associa-
tion. 1 77 Concerns about the Act, however, have been voiced by some in
the managed care industry. 78
One concern of MCOs is the use of the "prudent layperson" definition
168. Id.
169. 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (1996) (providing Group Health Plan Requirements, Require-
ments Relating to Portability, Access and Renewability).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (1996); 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (1996). These acts require that new
mothers and their infants be allowed to stay in the hospital for at least 48 hours after
delivery. Id. The act pertains to "all health plans, including HMOs and self-funded plans."





175. Baldassano, supra note 3, at 1546.
176. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT, AMA APPLAUDS INTRODUC-
TION OF "ACCESS TO EMERGENCY SERVICES ACT" (Feb. 25, 1997).
177. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT ON THE ACCESS TO EMERGENCY
MEDICAL SERVICES ACT OF 1997 (Feb. 25, 1997).
178. Lloyd, supra note 35, at Al, A10.
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of emergency. MCOs are concerned that the courts might interpret the
"prudent layperson" standard so broadly that MCOs never would be al-
lowed to deny care.179 It is feared that the statute would mandate pay-
ment for the slightest pain.18 0  However, one major MCO, Kaiser
Permanente, endorsed the prudent layperson standard. In August 1996,
it issued a joint statement with the ACEP calling for federal standards for
coverage of emergency medical services. 18 1 Kaiser Permanente has also
announced its support for the AEMSA-97. 82
The MCO industry is concerned with curtailing unnecessary and inap-
propriate use of emergency medical service by MCO members.' 83 This
stems from the pressure that employers put on MCOs to lower inappro-
priate use of emergency services. 184 This is because emergency medical
care is expensive, and its unpredictable, episodic nature is in direct con-
flict with the coordinated care that MCOs are in business to provide.
185
MCOs contend that to keep costs down they must be able to stop their
members from using the hospital emergency room for trivial medical
problems that could be handled better by a primary care physician.'
86
179. For a good discussion of the opposing sides of the "prudent layperson" definition
of emergency debate, see Clark, supra note 1, at 16-18. See also Baldassano, supra note 3,
at 1546.
180. Sharn, supra note 6, at I (expressing concerns of Roger Taylor, Chief Medical of-
ficer at Cypress, California based Pacificare Health Systems Inc., a major California
MCO).
181. See Joint Statement of American College of Emergency Physicians and Kaiser
Permanente on Federal Standards of Emergency Medical Services (ACEP and Kaiser
Permanente), Aug. 19,1996 (on file with author); Doug Levy, Taking the Guesswork out of
ER Coverage, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 1996, at ID; George Anders, Kaiser Permanente,
Doctors' Group Seek Greater Coverage of Emergency Service, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1996,
at A2.
182. KAISER PERMANENTE, KAISER PERMANENTE ADVOCATES NATIONAL COVERAGE
FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE (Feb. 25, 1997).
183. See Pear, supra note 6, at 1, 22.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Sharn, supra note 6, at 1 ("[Ilnsurers say that to hold down ever-spiraling health
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Thus, anything that the AEMSA does to restrict MCOs from managing
their members' care is something that MCOs naturally would oppose.
B. Selective State Exemption from ERISA Preemption
Another solution to the problems concerning the regulation of MCOs
and emergency medical care is for Congress to exempt individual states
from ERISA.187 Exemption from ERISA on a state-by-state basis would
remove a major obstacle to health care reform for those states enacting
comprehensive statutory reform measures. Without such an exception,
such programs are deemed to be preempted by ERISA because they "re-
late to" employee benefit plans. Currently, the only state specifically ex-
empted from ERISA preemption is Hawaii, which implemented a law
requiring most employers to provide employees with health insurance.' 88
The possibility of general state-specific exemption from ERISA, how-
ever, seems unlikely. In 1994, a bill was introduced into the Senate that
would have permitted state-specific ERISA exemptions. 189 This bill went
nowhere, however, in large part because business is opposed to health
care regulations that vary widely from one state to another. 190 After this
defeat, there is still Congressional interest in creating state-specific ex-
emptions, although there is nothing on the horizon to suggest Congress
will adopt state-specific ERISA preemption waivers.'
91
C. The MCO Solution
The attitude of some in the managed care industry concerning the issue
of emergency medical service is that no additional regulation is
needed. 192 It has been suggested that Oroblems concerning MCOs and
emergency medical service are not industry-wide, but instead are a mini-
mal problem caused by a few MCOs.' 93 For example, while there are
187. See Renee Blankenau, The Unfriendly Giant; With Reform's Collapse, Will States
Ever Get ERISA Off Their Backs, HOSPITALS 38-41 (Jan. 5, 1995) available in LEXIS,
Health Law File; Butler, supra note 146, at 22.
188. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5) (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 393-1 to 393-51 (Michie 1988 &
Supp. 1992). See Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism: Legal Impediments to State
Health Care Reform, 19 AM. J. L. & MED. 121, 133 (1993). See also Blankenau, supra note
187, at 138 (discussing Hawaii's exemption from ERISA).
189. See Blankenau, supra note 187, at 38. In 1994, a bill was introduced into the Sen-
ate by Senator George J. Mitchell, Senator Bob Grahm, and Senator Mark 0. Hatfield to
allow state-specific exemption from ERISA. Id.
190. Id. at 40.
191. See id.
192. Baldassano, supra note 3, at 1546.
193. Sharn, supra note 6, at 1.
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some MCOs that deny less then one percent of MCO-member emergency
medical service claims because they were either not authorized or not
urgent, there are other plans which deny fifteen percent or more of all
claims. 94 The refusal of claims may vary widely, with some MCOs deny-
ing coverage two to three times the number of claims other MCOs at the
same hospital reject.195
It has been argued that market forces will solve whatever problems
exist in regard to MCOs and emergency medical care. Simply put, if indi-
viduals choose not to join the offending MCOs, this market decision on
the part of the consumer will cost the offending MCOs money, and force
them to change their ways.196 One response to this argument, however, is
that today many individuals do not have a choice of health care providers
because this decision is made by their employers.197 Given the constant
pressure in business to reduce the bottom line, many employers might be
willing to sign on with a MCO if it is less expensive, despite the fact that
the MCO limits payment for, and patient access to, emergency medical
care.
The thrust of the MCOs' argument might be summed up as follows.
Problems with MCO payment for and coverage of emergency medical
service are isolated and are not widespread throughout the industry.'98
The limited problems that do exist are a result of growing pains that re-
sult from the transition from a fee-for-service health system to a managed
care health system.1 99 It is the free market, not government regulation,
that will provide the best solution because the free-market will force out
those MCOs that are not meeting their members' emergency health care
needs, making the system more efficient.20 0 Government reform, such as
the Access to Emergency Medical Service Act, would just make the
health care system more expensive by forcing MCOs to pay for unneces-
194. Id.
195. Id. (based on an analysis of claims handled by Emergency Physicians Billing Ser-
vice in Oklahoma City).
196. See Baldassano, supra note 3, at 1546 (industry spokesman suggesting that ulti-
mately, "employers and patients will demand access to emergency services").
197. One indication of the number of Americans that get their insurance through their
employers is the GAO's estimate that 114 million persons, approximately 44% of the
United States' population, receive medical coverage through ERISA health plans. GAO,
supra note 148, at 2.
198. See Baldassano, supra note 3, at 1546.
199. Id. at 1548.
200. See id. at 1546.
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sary emergency medical service. 01
D. Maintain the Status Quo
One final possibility is to do nothing on the federal level in terms of
national regulations, or state-specific ERISA exemptions. Rather, the
states might continue to pass reform legislation and look to the Supreme
Court's ruling in New York Conference of Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers
Insurance2 0 2 to save their statutes from ERISA preemption. Travelers
upheld a state law that required hospitals to collect surcharges from all
insurers other than Blue Cross/Blue Shield.2" 3 It still is unclear, however,
how far reaching this decision will be and whether it will save other types
of state health care regulation from ERISA preemption.0 4
VII. CONCLUSION
The current situation regarding federal and state regulation of MCO
coverage of emergency medical service is unstable. The interaction of
state and federal laws has created an environment that has allowed some
players in the managed care industry to utilize abusive practices through
which they avoid paying for, and hamper member access to, emergency
medical service. It seems doubtful that the present system in which hos-
pitals are required by federal law to provide emergency medical care to
MCO members under EMTALA, while payment from MCOs is uncer-
tain, will last indefinitely.20 5 Some critics of managed care warn that the
current legal situation cannot last because if MCOs are too successful in
avoiding payments to hospital emergency departments, some hospitals
will be forced to close their emergency departments and emergency care
may not be as widely available, especially to the poor.20 6 It is apparent
that because EMTALA was created before the advent of managed care,
and because it has been held to apply only to hospitals and not to MCOs,
201. See id. (presenting the argument that legislation such as the AEMSA would elimi-
nate incentives to use emergency medical service in a cost-effective way).
202. 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995).
203. Travelers, 115 S.Ct. at 1683.
204. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Travelers decision
and its effect on ERISA preemption of state health care law).
205. Loder & Clark, supra note 17, at B9.
206. See Clark, supra note 1, at 19; Williams, supra note 13, at 642-46 (suggesting that
the cost of emergency room visits for non-urgent care is not, in fact, that great and that the
potential savings from diverting all nonurgent visits to private doctor's offices may be much
less than is widely believed).
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it is inadequate for today's health care environment, must be supple-
mented or replaced.
While the managed care industry might prefer the free market to solve
what they consider to be isolated problems with emergency medical care,
it seems unlikely that will happen. Even if AEMSA-97 never becomes
law, it appears that many states are eager to find other ways to regulate
MCOs and emergency medical care. It may be that with the Supreme
Court's Travelers decision, ERISA may be less likely to preempt state
laws regulating health care.
In the final analysis, a federal statute such as the Access to Emergency
Medical Service Act may be the best solution to the complicated legal
issues surrounding the regulation of payment for and access to, MCO
member emergency medical care. AEMSA-97 addresses financial and
access concerns by providing a uniform solution applicable to all the
states. Employers, MCOs, hospitals, and individuals could, under the
AEMSA-97, depend on a national regulatory framework for MCOs and
emergency medical care, rather than be forced to deal with the patchwork
of state laws that would likely evolve if no federal legislation is passed.
Importantly, although AEMSA-97 does provide national uniformity, it
also gives states flexibility to enact their own legislation, so long as it
"does not prevent the application of federal law."2 7 Thus, AEMSA-97
would ensure a minimum standard of emergency medical care for all
MCO members, including those who are in self-funded plans.
Christopher J. Young
207. Cardin Announcement, supra note 167.
19971

